The time before the GDPR enters into force is relentlessly ticking away. Do not worry, in this post I am neither going to paint scary pictures of what companies will have to face, nor make a list of what you should forget about when this law is enacted; I will “just” focus on the processing of personal data of children, namely the Article 8 that regulates the conditions for granting consent with processing of the child’s personal data in connection with information society services.
On the 7th of December 2017, the MoQoS project held its first stakeholders´ workshop aimed at measuring the so-called Quality of Service of high-speed Internet using the crowdsourcing method.
Have you ever thought of automating the certificate issuing in your organization’s internal certification authority? How about using the same procedure as in Let’s Encrypt and the ACME protocol, while enjoying all the benefits ACME has to offer? The possible solution is to use Boulder. I will now try to break down for you the Boulder’s installation process and the pitfalls that I encountered during the setup.
A golden opportunity: the bank we’re about to rob is moving to new premises today. To our luck, they’re also testing alarms until 4 PM, so it won’t be suspicious if we accidentally set one off. There is an open window on the first floor protected by a single sensor. Our inside man among the staff has placed an IP camera into the sensor cabinet, so we can see if the sensor we are trying to break has the ‘status OK’ or the alarm is screaming. The IP camera is streaming to YouTube — alas with a delay. The problem is that the sensor communicates via radio waves: every 15 to 30 seconds the diode beeps and the device sends a signal. We’re listening, trying to imitate it, and when we’re sure, we’re gonna shut down the sensor and turn on our little imitation that we built. What is left is just to arrange the tin foil between the antennas, like this… the sensor alarm’s blaring! We are holding our ears and will try again in half a minute.
Last week, thanks to the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) conference, Prague became the center of the Internet community. It was for the fourth time that the Czech Republic was given the honor to host this important meeting where RFC (Request for Comments) standards are created: Prague hosted it in March 2007 (68th IETF), 2011 (80th IETF) and July 2015 (93th IETF), with our Association having taken part in organizing the last three meetings.
The ongoing first nationwide competition in cyber security attracted not only students of technical fields, but also many gymnasium students. The first round of the competition was attended by 1,067 participants from 162 schools of various specialization from across the country. The only restriction was the age (15-18 years), in order that the most successful competitors be qualified for the European Cyber Security Challenge. Most students came from the Prague, South Moravia, Pardubice and Vysočina regions.
Near the end of the old year, a juicy discussion broke out in the “main” IETF mailing list. Although it was ignited by a bizarre proposal of IP version 10, in reality it reflects a general frustration caused by the sluggish pace of IPv6 deployment. John Klensin, one of Internet’s grandfathers, expressed a surprisingly sceptical and self-critical opinion. He means that IPv6 proponents gradually lose on credibility: “[We] spent many years trying to tell people that IPv6 was completely ready, that all transition issues had been sorted out and that deployment would be easy and painless. When those stories became ever more clearly false, we then fell back on claims or threats that failure to deploy IPv6 before assorted events occurred would cause some evil demon to rise up [and] devour them and their networks. Most of those events have now occurred without demonstrable bad effects; …”
This year’s December 5 made it into the history of Czech Internet security by crossing a significant threshold. From this date, in the registry of .cz domains there are more domains with DNSSEC security than those which lack this protocol extension. Information provided by DNS systems of more than 51% (653,297) of .cz domains can now be authenticated to ensure that it was not spoofed on the way to the user.
Last year’s success of our memory game (“pexeso”) during the education project in Ethiopia was repeated this year in another African country, São Tomé and Príncipe located directly on the equator in the middle of the Gulf of Guinea.