Dear readers of our blog, thank you for your support and we wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year. We look forward to seeing you in 2024.
The CZ.NIC team
Knot Resolver 6.x News
In this post, I’d like to introduce the upcoming major version of Knot Resolver project, which is currently in the testing and debugging phase, and we would greatly appreciate if you could try it out and give us any feedback on it.
Sentinel View report – October 2023
An interesting dynamic is happening at the top of the attackers’ chart. First of all, Iranian attacks were overshadowed by other countries to the degree that we no longer see them in higher positions. To mention the current top four most significant, we would highlight Romania, Germany, Bulgaria, and the Netherlands. There had been consistent attacks from Germany that came into prominence about the 4th of October and then slowly started to disappear on the 16th until the final dissolution on the 18th of October. The graph line for German attacks looks very stable and consistent. On the other hand, Romania’s malicious activity, which took the top of the charts, looked erratic and unorganized in the graph. To the degree that Sentinel View graphs in the Incidents section, except for Top countries by recorded incidents, are rendered almost useless.
Sentinel View report – September 2023
On the first pages of the Report, we can see that September numbers are very comparable to August data. Iran-based attackers moved away from top charts, and we see that addresses from the United States now take the lead in the HTTP minipot incidents records.
Sentinel View report – August 2023
Minipot attacks decreased by nearly a half from the preceding month in August. The subnet 46.148.40.0/24 members were not so active last month, and we can see addresses from other countries emerging at the top of the table. Notable mentions go to some European countries, namely Germany and Romania, who got back into the spotlight.
Sentinel View report – July 2023
Number of individual attackers had risen and minipot attacks doubled. Last month only three of the top attackers emerged from subnet 46.148.40.0/24, yet this month the majority of all attackers came from this Iraq subnet.
RFC 9432: DNS Catalog zones
A DNS zone is usually served by multiple authoritative servers, which is actually recommended for the sake of redundancy. Large authoritative DNS operators even combine different name server implementations to avoid complete infrastructure outage in case of any software error. For synchronizing zone contents between authoritative servers, a DNS-specific mechanism is available, called zone transfer. It is well established and supported by all common DNS implementations. It enables both full zone transfer (AXFR) and incremental update (IXFR).
Sentinel View report – June 2023
The total number incidents decreased by half. However, there are only slightly fewer than 10,000 distinct attackers on the greylist. The last month’s seemingly minor reduction may have been indicative of an ongoing decline.
Sentinel View report – May 2023
The overall count for total incidents dropped by 100 million. Sounds like a lot, but given the number of attacks we recorded (1.6 billion), it is just less than 10% decrease. Still significant, but not as shocking as hundred millions sounds. The results for minipot traps have not changed significantly from previous month, it seems the attackers are pretty consistent in regards to what services interest them the most.
Sentinel View report – April 2023
Moving to April, we gained almost ten thousand more unique attackers on average, according to the Greylist. To provide even more context to the events, we added yet another interesting figure — the number of total incidents recorded.
